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Casenotes and Statute Notes
TORTS-LIABILITY LIMITATIONS UNDER THE WARSAW
CONVENTION-The cargo liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention are fully enforceable at the rate of $9.07 per
pound. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104
S. Ct. 1776 (1984).
In 1979 Franklin Mint Corporation (Franklin Mint) de-
livered 714 pounds of numismatic' material to Trans
World Airlines (TWA) for shipment from Philadelphia to
London. 2 Franklin Mint did not make a special declara-
tion of value at the time of shipment. The material was
lost during the shipment and Franklin Mint sued for the
value of the coins, $250,000. 4
Because the parties agreed that TWA was responsible
for the loss, 5 the extent of TWA's liability under the War-
saw Convention 6 was the only issue. 7 TWA claimed that
the liability limits8 of the Warsaw Convention should be
converted into United States currency by use of one of
I "Numismatic" is defined as relating to currency or coins. WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1674 (2d Ed. 1951).
2 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
i Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776, 1779 (1984).
The terms of the Warsaw Convention provide that if the consignor makes a spe-
cial declaration of value and pays an extra amount, if necessary, the carrier will be
liable for the declared sum. Warsaw Convention, infra note 6, art. 22(2).
4 104 S. Ct. at 1778.
. Id.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), reprinted
at 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention or the
treaty].
7 104 S. Ct. at 1778.
See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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three conversion factors: (1) the official price of gold prior
to repeal of the Par Value Modification Act;9 (2) Special
Drawing Rights (SDRs) established by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF);10 or (3) the exchange value of the
current French franc."I Franklin Mint argued that the
free-market price of gold should be the correct conver-
sion factor.' 2 The district court found that the last official
price of gold in the United States established by law was
the appropriate unit of conversion and therefore awarded
Franklin Mint $6,475.98 plus interest and cost.1 3 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the re-
sults reached in the district court, but held that sixty days
hence the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention would
be unenforceable in the United States. They based their
decision on the fact that enforcement of the Warsaw Con-
vention requires a conversion factor and there is no
United States legislation specifying a conversion factor to
be used by the court.' 4 Held, affirmed judgment of the court of
appeals but rejected its declaration that the Warsaw Convention is
prospectively unenforceable: The cargo liability limits of the
Warsaw Convention are fully enforeceable at the rate of
$9.07 per pound. Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984).
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention,' 5 originally negotiated in
1925 and 1929, is a treaty which regulates the liability of
o Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat.
2660 (1976) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 286-386K-2 (1982)). See infra
text accompanying notes 64-87.
t0 SDRs are defined as the average value of a defined basket of IMF member
currency. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
" 525 F. Supp. at 1289. TWA did not argue for using the exchange value of the
current French franc before the Supreme Court.
12 Id.
I Id.
14 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303, 309-12 (2d Cir.
1982).
15 See supra note 6.
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airlines for flights involving international transporta-
tion. 6 The United States, while not a party to the original
negotiations, adhered to the treaty in 1934.' 7 More than
120 nations, including the United States, continue to be
bound by this treaty.'" The Warsaw Convention is now
considered the primary source of law concerning the legal
relationship between the airlines and their passengers and
shippers for international air travel.' 9
The most important goal of the Warsaw Convention
was to limit the liability of an airline in the event of per-
sonal injury or property damage. 20  The drafters of the
treaty considered liability limits necessary to attract in-
- I L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 11.01[1] (1983) [hereinafter cited
as L. KRIENDLER]; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Con-
vention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (1967). For purposes of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, "international transportation" is defined as:
[Any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the
parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether
or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are
situated either within the territories of two High Contracting Parties,
or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is
an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sover-
eignty, suzerainty [overlordship], mandate or authority of another
power, even though that power is not party to this convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 1(2). The airline ticket is used to determine
whether a flight is under the Warsaw Convention. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn,
supra at 500.
17 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 502. L. KREINDLER, supra note
16, at 11-3.
'" U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 207-08 (1983).
Rhyne, International Law and Air Transportation, 47 MICH. L. REV. 41, 55
(1968).
-, Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 498-99. The liability limit was
also a principal factor in the decision of the United States to ratify the Warsaw
Convention. Secretary of State Hull, in his report to the Senate in 1934 concern-
ing the treaty, stated:
It is believed that the principal of limitation of liability will not only
be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite
basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but that it will
prove to be an aid in the development of international air transpor-
tation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a more definite and
equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with the probable
result that there would eventually be a reduction of operating ex-
penses for the carrier and advantages to travelers and shippers in
the way of reduced transportation charges.
Id. at 499-500.
A secondary goal of the Warsaw Convention was to establish a degree of uni-
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vestment capital to the infant airline industry.2' Without
these liability limits, the drafters feared investors would
forego the airline industry because of the potential for
catastrophic claims resulting from a single accident. 22
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention limits the liability
of international air carriers for injury to passengers and
cargo.23 The limitations are expressed in French francs
which are further specified to consist of "65.5 milligrams
of gold at the standard fineness of nine hundred
formity in documenting international air travel and in handling claims resulting
from international flights. Id. at 498-99.
21 L. KREINDLER, supra note 16, at 11-2; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
16, at 499. See generally, Tompkins, Limitation of Liability by Treaty and Statute, 36J.
AIR L. & CoM. 421 (1970). The imposition of liability limitations is a significant
departure from ordinary American tort law, which attempts to make the victim
"whole" again. L. KREINDLER, supra note 16, at 11-7. See generally, A. LOWENFELD,
AVIATION LAW, ch. 7, § 1 (1981).
22 L. KREINDLER, supra note 16, at 11-2; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
16, at 499.
23 Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 22. Article 22 provides:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for
each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical pay-
ments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the lia-
bility of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilo-
gram, unless the consignor has made, at the time when the package
was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at
delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires.
In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the
declared sum, unless he proves that the sum is greater than the ac-
tual value to the consignor at delivery.
Id. Article 25 of the Warsaw Convention provides that the liability limits are not
available if the accident was caused by willful misconduct. Id. art. 25. There has
been much debate on the scope of article 25 and the meaning of "willful miscon-
duct." There is some question whether there was an accurate translation of article
25 from the original French to English, but the basic idea is that "one must not be
able to limit his liability for intentionally inflicted harm." A. LOWENFELD, supra
note 21, at 7-77. L. KREINDLER, supra note 16, at 11-13, 11-23; Lowenfeld & Men-
delsohn, supra note 16, at 503-04; Rhyne, supra note 19, at 59-61; Milligan, Warsaw
Convention - Did the Carriers Take All Necessary Measures to Avoid the Damage to the
Convention - Or Was it Impossible For Them to Take Such Measures?, 33 J. AIR L. &
COM. 675, 678 (1967).
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thousandths. '2 4 The delegates to the Convention specifi-
cally rejected a French proposal to use an undefined
French franc, preferring instead to tie the franc to a speci-
fied quantity and fineness of gold.2 5  Article 22 also al-
lowed the limits to be converted into any national
currency.26
Although the air carriers received the primary benefit
from the Warsaw Convention through liability limits, the
treaty also provided a quid pro quo to the passengers by
making the carriers presumptively liable.2 7 In the United
21 Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 22. Francs with this gold content are
often called Poincare francs, deriving their name from the French prime minister
whose government set the gold content for the franc. "The Poincare franc has
been used in all gold clause limitations of liability provided for in multilateral
conventions concerning transportation by sea or by air, concluded after 1924."
Asser, Golden Limitations of Liability in International Transport Conventions and the Cur-
rency Crisis, 5J. MAR. L. & COM. 645, at 645-46 (1974).
2-1 For example, the Swiss delegate expressed disfavor with using the French
franc by stating:
Naturally, one can say "French franc" but the French franc, it's your
national law which determines it, and one need have only a modifica-
tion of the national law to overturn the essence of this provision.
We must base ourselves on an international value, and we have
taken the [gold] dollar. Let one take the gold French franc, it's all
the same to me, but let's take a gold value . . . as a basis of calcula-
tion, be it American or French.
Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S.Ct. 1776, 1790 (1984) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
26 Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 22(4).
27 Id. arts. 17, 18, 20, 21. The articles of the treaty which deal with carrier liabil-
ity include the following:
Article 17
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury sufferd
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the opera-
tions of embarking or disembarking.
Article 18
(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage or
any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained
took place during the transportation by air.
Article 20
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures.
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not
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States, the Warsaw Convention establishes almost abso-
lute liability within the limitations created by the treaty.28
This trade-off is carried out through a shift in the burden
of proof to the carrier in exchange for a limit to the car-
rier's liability. 29 The drafters considered the exchange
reasonable due to the difficulty of passengers in determin-
ing the cause of an airline accident.3 0
be liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in
piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation and that, in
all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary meas-
ures to avoid the damage.
Article 21
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused by or contributed to
by the negligence of the injured person the court may, in accordance
with the provision or its own law, exonerate the carrier wholly or
partly from his liability.
Id. See L. KREINDLER, supra note 16, at 11-10. See generally, A. LOWENFELD, supra
note 21, at 7-28; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 500.
28 L. KREINDLER, supra note 16, at 11-11. For an exhaustive analysis of the air-
lines' liability and specifically their liability where the cause of damage/accident is
unknown, see Hjalsted, The Air Carrier's Liability in Cases of Unknown Cause of Damage
in InternationalAir Law (pts. 1 & 2), 27J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 119 (1960). The carrier
is held liable unless satisfactory evidence is presented that it is not at fault. The
burden of proof is on the carrier. Id. at 119, 124-25. It is exceedingly difficult for
the air carrier to prove that they "have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible . . . to take such measures." L. KREINDLER,
supra note 16, at 11-11.
29 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 500.
3o Id. This trade-off has been severely criticized as no longer applicable today.
Id. at 519-22; L. KREINDLER, supra note 16, at 11-10. Today, "the benefit to the
passenger derived from the presumption of liability is nominal. In civil law coun-
tries liability is presumed anyway. And in common law countries the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur is generally available to establish a prima facia case." L. KREIN-
DLER, supra note 16, at 11-10. In 1934, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not
universally applied in all jurisdictions in the United States; therefore, the shift in
burden of proof had a significant impact. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
16, at 521-22. Res ipsa loquitur is more universally applied in cases of unexplained
airline accidents. Technically there is a difference between a shift in the burden of
proof (provided by the Warsaw Convention) and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
"[Iln a litigated case, if the defendant offers no evidence as to the cause of the
accident, plaintiff is entitled, under [the] Warsaw [Convention], to a directed ver-
dict on the issue of fault, whereas under res ipsa loquitur he is entitled only to have
his case submitted to the jury." Id. This technical distinction has resulted in few
real differences in the outcome of cases. Id.
In addition to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[i]nvestigation of the causes of
accidents has reached a very advanced stage and it is rare today that the probable
cause of an accident cannot be determined as a result of the combined efforts of
the governments concerned, the air carrier and the manufacturer." Tompkins,
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The delegates to the Warsaw Convention saw the treaty
as part of an on-going process 3' and from the beginning
there was debate concerning whether the liability limits
were set at the correct level.3 2 As time progressed the
battle lines have been clearly drawn with one side con-
tending the limits are too low and the opposing side con-
tending that the limits are satisfactory or too high. 3
Those in favor of raising the limits or doing away with
liability limits completely contend that the maturing air-
line industry no longer needs the protection of liability
limits.3 4 Furthermore, those in the United States arguing
that the limits are too low contend that limiting liability is
contrary to the American tort system.35
Those in favor of the liability limitations provision of
the Warsaw Convention contend that the amount of the
limit is satisfactory to the greatest number of nations, in-
cluding less developed countries.3 6 Liability limits pro-
Limitation of Liability by Treaty and Statute, 36 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 421, 431 (1970)
(footnote omitted).
31 R. HORNER & D. LEGREZ, SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
AERONAUTICAL LAW, MINUTES, WARSAW, OCT. 4-12, 1929 (1975) (cited in Brief of
Franklin Mint Corp. at 13, Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 104 S.Ct.
1776 (1984)). As a vice-president of the Warsaw Convention stated: "[W]e
should consider that in air navigation, it is necessary to begin by laying down the
primary general rules of the problem; we make a first effort and we must be happy
to do so. If there are improvements to be brought forth, life does not end today,
we can do them later on." Id.
32 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 504.
I3 d.
34 Id.; L. KREINDLER, supra note 16, at 11-9, 11-10; See generally A. LOWENFELD,
supra note 21, § 1; Rhyne, supra note 19, at 54-64.
35 Kreindler, A Plaintiff's View of Montreal, 33J. AIR L. & CoM. 528, 530 (1967).
The purpose of the American tort system is to compensate the injured party. "It
is absolutely basic and fundamental to American citizens that an injured person
should be appropriately compensated for the loss he has sustained." Id.
36 Parker, The Adequacy of the Passenger Libility Limits of the Warsaw Convention of
1929, 14 J. AIR L. & CoM. 37, 39 (1947).
The value placed on a human life varies widely in many countries of
the world. In India, China, and Bolivia, for example, it is very low
indeed; in Spain, Italy, and the Balkans but little higher. In the
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries it is much higher. In
France, Germany as it was, and Britain it is higher still, and in the
United States it is at a higher value than in any other country. It was
generally agreed that a limitation of liability had to be established.
At what figure should this limitation be set? It obviously had to be a
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mote quick settlement of claims and result in uniform
damage awards.3 7 Another argument is that raising liabil-
ity limits would increase the cost to passengers and ship-
pers due to higher insurance rates38 and if the passengers
or shippers want higher limits, they can always self-in-
sure. 39 Furthermore, staggering liabilities continue to ex-
ist for air carriers. 4 0
The debate over the Warsaw Convention has led to var-
ious revisions of the treaty, with the first proposed
amendments occurring at the Hague Conference in
1955. 4 ' Two changes were made to the liability limitation
provisions of the treaty by the Hague Protocol. 42 One
change subjected the carrier to unlimited liability if it is
proved that "the damage resulted from an act or omission
of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with intent to
cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that dam-
age would probably result."'4 3  The second change
doubled the liability limit contained in the Warsaw Con-
vention and allowed the court, at its discretion, to award
court costs and other litigation expenses." The United
practical mean which would make it possible for all countries to rat-
ify the Convention, for otherwise it could not become international
law. This led to the adoption of what we in the United States would
consider a relatively modest sum, with a quid pro quo of putting the
responsibility on the carrier and making the burden of defense rest
upon him rather than on the plaintiff.
Id.
I7 Kreindler, supra note 16, at 11-9. See generally Martin, The Defendant's View of
Montreal, 33J. AIR L. & COM. 538, 540 (1967).
so Hildred, Air Carriers' Liability: Significance of the Warsaw Convention and Events
Leading Up to the Montreal Agreement, 33J. AIR L. & CoM. 521, 523 (1967).
39 Martin, supra note 37, at 539-40; Hildred, supra note 38, at 523; Kreindler,
supra note 16, at 11-9.
40 Kreindler, supra note 16, at 11-8 (quoting H. DRION, LIMITATION OF LIABILI-
TIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW (1954)). See generally Martin, supra note 37.
4 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 504. For a thorough discussion
of the events surrounding the Hague Protocol, see Beaumont, The Warsaw Conven-
tion of 1929, as Amended by the Protocol Signed at the Hague on September 28, 1955, 22 J.
AIR L. & COM. 414 (1955).
42 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929,
478 U.N.T.S. 371 (1963) [hereinafter cited as the Hague Protocol].
43 Id. at 383, art. XIII, 383.
44 Id. at 381, art. XI, 381. The proposal provides in pertinent part:
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States signed the Hague Protocol but it was never ratified
by the Senate.45
By 1965, having failed to ratify the Hague Protocol, the
United States formally denounced the Warsaw Conven-
tion following the procedure set out under Article 39.46
The denouncement was due to the low liability limits for
personal injury and death. 47 The United States specified
that it would withdraw the denunciation if there was a rea-
sonable prospect of an international agreement eliminat-
ing liability limits or raising the limits to $100,000 and if,
pending an agreement, the airlines would agree to a limit
of $75,000 per passenger.4 8Negotiations following the United States' denunciation
resulted in a private agreement 49 between the major air-
The limits prescribed in this article shall not prevent the court from
awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole or
part of the court costs and of the other expenses of the litigation
incurred by the plaintiff. The foregoing provision shall not apply ifthe amount of the damages awarded, excluding court costs and
other expenses of the litigation, does not exceed the sum which the
carrier has offered in writing to the plaintiff within a period of six
months from the date of the occurrence causing the damage, or
before the commencement of the action, if that is later.
ld.
d45 For an exhaustive analysis of politics surrounding the Hague Protocol and its
submission to the United States Senate, see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
16, at 509-46.
46 Id. at 551. See generally Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 39. Article 39
provides:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this con-
vention by a notification addressed to the Government of the Re-
public of Poland, which shall at once inform the Government of each
of the High Contracting Parties. (2) Denunciation shall take effect
six months after notification of denunciation, and shall operate only
as regards the party which shall have proceeded to denunciation.
Id.
4 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 551-52; see, Haskell, The Warsaw
System and the U.S. Constitution Revisited, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 483, 486-87.
48 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 552 (citing 50 DEP'T STATE BULL.
923 (1965)); Kreindler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. &
COM. 291, 291 (1965).
49 Comment, From Warsaw to Tenerife: Chronological Analysis of the Liability Limita-
tions Imposed Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45J. AIR L. & COM. 653, 669 (1980).
The author stated that: "The Montreal Agreement, unlike the original Warsaw
Convention and the Hague Protocol, is a 'special contract' in accordance with
article 22(1). Proper tendering of ticket combined with reasonable notice of its
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lines known as the Montreal Agreement of 1966.50 One
basic provision of the Agreement raised liability limits to
$75,000. 5 ' The Agreement specified that the airline ticket
must include notice of the liability limits. 52  Under the
Montreal Agreement, the air carriers relinquished certain
defenses under Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention, re-
sulting in airlines being almost strictly liable for acci-
dents.53 Upon the signing of the Montreal Agreement,
the United States withdrew its denunciation.5 4
The debate concerning the liability limits continued.
Therefore, in 1971 the signators met to revise the Warsaw
Convention. 55  The resulting Guatemala Protocol 56 in-
creased the liability limit for personal injury, but did not
raise the liability limits for cargo. 57 It also made the air-
contents will bind a passenger to its stipulated terms." Id. See supra note 23 for
text of article 22(1).
- Civil Aeronautics Board, Order No. E-23680 (May 13, 1966), 31 Fed. Reg.
7302 (1966), approving Civil Aeronautics Board, Agreement 18900, Agreement
Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Proto-
col (1966).
5' Montreal Agreement, supra note 50.
52 Id.
- Id. Article 20 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
(1) The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for him or them to take such measures.
(2) In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not
be liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in
piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation and that, in
all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary meas-
ures to avoid the damage.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 20. See Comment, The Growth of American
Judicial Hostility Towards the Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention, 48 J. AIR L.
& COM. 805, 813, n.60 (1983). The author stated that "[t]he only defense left to
the airlines under the Montreal Agreement is contributory negligence of the pas-
senger under Article 21 of the Warsaw Convention." Id.
- Montreal Agreement, supra note 50.
55 Mankiewicz, The 1971 Protocol of Guatemala City to Further Amend the 1929 War-
saw Convention, 38J. AIR L. & COM. 519, 519 (1972).
- Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Carriage by Air, ICAO Doc. No. 8932 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Guatemala Protocol].
57 Id. at 8, art. VIII. The liability limit for shipment of goods was not raised.
The probable reason is that shippers usually take out insurance for their cargo.
Mankiewicz, supra note 55, at 544.
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lines absolutely liable.58 The drafters based the Protocol's
acceptance on ratification by the United States;59 the par-
ties to the Warsaw Convention are still waiting for the
United States' ratification.60
The most recent significant revision to the Warsaw
Convention occured in Montreal in 1975.61 This confer-
ence was held to adapt the treaty to changes in the inter-
national monetary system.6 2  To fully understand the
Montreal Protocols 63 and their relation to the Supreme
Court's decision in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., it is necessary to review the history of international
monetary policy.
B. History of International Monetary Policy in Relation to the
Warsaw Convention
Following World War I a gold exchange system was de-
veloped by the United States Federal Reserve Board and
the Bank of England, whereby the United States dollar
and other major currencies were convertible into a spe-
cific quantity of gold.64 The United States Gold Standard
Act of 1900 established the dollar's value at $20.67 per
troy ounce of gold. 65 In 1934, before the United States
adhered to the Warsaw Convention, the United States de-
valued the dollar, thereby raising the price of gold to
$35.00 an ounce.66
In 1944 forty-five countries held a conference, the Bret-
58 See Guatemala Protocol, supra note 56, at 8, art. VIII. Mankiewicz, supra note
55, at 523-29; Comment, supra note 49, at 672-77.
-1 Comment, supra note 49, at 672-77.
- Comment, supra note 49, at 677; Comment, supra note 53, at 814.
61 FitzGerald, The Four Montreal Protocols to Amend the Warsaw Convention Regime
Governing International Carriage by.Air, 42J. AIR L. & COM. 273, 275 (1976).
62 Id. at 275-77.
63 Additional Protocol No. 1-4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12
October 1929. ICAO Doc. Nos. 9145-9148 (1975).
Heller, The Value of the Gold Franc - A Different Point of View, 6 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 73, 79 (1974).
-5 31 Stat. 45, ch. 41, § 1 (1900), cited in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776, 1781 (1984).
W Heller, supra note 64; Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 337 (1934).
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ton Woods Conference,67 concerning the international
monetary policy. An organization known as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) was created 68 at the confer-
ence and the United States became a member in 1945.69
Members of the IMF were to maintain a "par value" for
their currency and to exchange gold at the official price
for balances of their currency held by other IMF nations.7y
Until the 1960's, there was very little interference by
world government authorities in the private gold mar-
ket.7 ' The market price for gold stabilized near the offi-
cial price of $35.00 per ounce with little help from world
governments.7 2 In 1968, however, various world govern-
ments were unable to stabilize the market price of gold
during a private gold buying rush.73 At this time, the
world governments developed a "two-tier" system of gold
prices, with national governments using the official price
6 See Heller, supra note 64.
Id. The IMF was created to provide short-term credit for developing coun-
tries and to stabilize foreign exchange rates. P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMIcs 686 (8th
ed. 1970).
69 Bretton Woods Agreement Act, 59 Stat. 512 (1945). By February 1974, 126
countries belonged to the IMF. Heller, supra note 64, at 79.
70 See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 68, at 687. The Deputy Managing Director of
the IMF stated:
[A]t the heart of the [Bretton Woods system] lies the proposition
that the interests of the international community are best served by a
system of multilateral surveillance and cooperation on exchange
rates and exchange practices. The operating core of this proposi-
tion is the provision in the Articles of Agreement of the Fund that
each country shall have a par value established in agreement with
the Fund and shall maintain the exchange rates for its currency
within a maximum of 1 percent fluctuation either side of the par
value . . . . Secondly, the system provides that there could be
changes in par values only when there is a fundamental dise-
quilibrium but establishes the principle that exchange rates are a
matter of international concern. It is left to the individual country to
decide when to propose such a change. Thirdly, each country has
the responsibility to establish and maintain the convertibility of its
currency on the basis of freedom from restrictions on current pay-
ments, although in practice convertibility has been much broader.
Heller, supra note 64, at 80-81 (quoting the Deputy Managing Director of the
IMF).
71 Heller, supra note 64, at 81.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 82.
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of $35.00 per ounce among themselves, and all private
transactions using the floating free-market price. 4 The
establishment of this two-tier system was the beginning of
the demise of the international gold-based monetary
system.75
In August, 1971, President Nixon severed the connec-
tion between gold and the dollar by refusing to convert
official foreign dollars into gold.76 In 1971 and 1973, the
dollar was devalued with the official price of gold rising
first to $38.00 per ounce77 and then to $42.22 per
ounce. 78  The price of $42.22 per ounce remained until
1978.
By 1973, many of the major trading nations had failed
to maintain a fixed par value for their currency and were
allowing their currencies to fluctuate ("float") at the free-
market price in clear violation of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem. 79  Realizing that the Bretton Woods system was no
longer being followed, 0 the IMF replaced gold as the
foundation for the international monetary system with a
unit of account known as the Special Drawing Right
74 Id.
- Id. at 79-91. See generally, Asser, Golden Limitations of Liability in International
Transport Conventions and the Currency Crisis, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 645, 650-652
(1974).
76 Asser, supra note 75, at 651.
77 Par Value Modification Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-268, § 2, 86 Stat. 116
(1972); Heller, supra note 64, at 83, 86.
78 Par Value Modification Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-110, § 2, 87 Stat. 352
(1973); Heller, supra note 64, at 83, 85.
79 Heller, supra note 64, at 84-86. Heller further states that:
The IMF put primary stress in its very early days on the fact that
fluctuating rates were inconsistent with its Articles, but very soon
pragmatic considerations began to overshadow the more technical
ones and in certain circumstances the IMF recognized the exigencies
of a situation and set up special rules for computing so-called "cen-
tral rates" as a temporary expediency.
Id. at 84.
80 Id. at 88. One author stated that: "Currency rates fluctuating according to
the law of supply and demand could no more be recognized as official-according
to IMF Articles-par values. The underlying principle of Bretton Woods that cur-
rency rates should be a matter of international concern was virtually a dead let-
ter." Id. (quote by Arcari in a paper produced on behalf of the Secretariat of the
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law in July, 1973. Id.)
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(SDR).8 t As of April 1, 1978, the SDR, defined as the av-
erage value of a specific basket of currency from IMF
countries, 82 was to become the lone reserve asset which
IMF nations could use in transactions amongst them-
selves. 83 The United States Congress passed the Bretton
Woods Agreement Act in 1976 implementing this change,
and the United States dollar was no longer defined in
terms of gold.84 Congress repealed the Par Value Modifi-
cation Act and as of April 1, 1978 there was no longer an
official price of gold in the United States.85 Gold became
a "volatile commodity",86 rather than an anchor in the in-
ternational monetary system. 7
Against this background signators of the Warsaw Con-
vention met at Montreal in 1975 to amend the treaty.88
The major goal at this conference was to revise the War-
saw Convention to reflect the developments in the inter-
national monetary system.8 9 Protocol No. 3 proposed to
change the personal injury liability limits of the Guate-
a, Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clarification, 13 J. MAR.
L. & CoM. 1, 2 (1981). The SDR was actually created by the IMF in 1969 but at
that time was defined as one thirty-fifth of an ounce of gold. The IMF later sev-
ered the connection between gold and the SDR, thereby eliminating gold as the
basis of the monetary system. 104 S. Ct. at 1781, n. 14.
82 Until 1981, the value of the SDR was based on a "basket" of sixteen curren-
cies. On January 1, 1981, the number of currencies in the basket was reduced to
five: the U.S. dollar, the West German mark, the French franc, the Japanese yen
and the English pound sterling. Ward, supra note 81, at 3.
- Id. at 2.
- Bretton Woods Agreement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat.
2660 (1976)..
85 Id. § 7.
- A. LOWENFELD, supra note 21, at 7-169. Lowenfeld stated:
Not only did gold (or more precisely the fixed gold/dollar ratio) no
longer serve as an anchor to which a fixed price - or limit of liability
- could be tied; by the mid- 1970's, gold had become a volatile com-
modity, not related to a price index, or to the rate of inflation, or
indeed to any meaningful economic measure, other than the views of
whoever made up the market about all of the terrible things going
on in the unpredictable world.
Id.
87 Id.
- FitzGerald, supra note 61, at 275.
so Id.
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mala Protocol from gold francs to SDRs.90 Protocol No. 4
would raise the cargo liability limits and also would con-
vert the new limits to SDRs.9 1 The Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations presented a report in favor of Protocols
3 and 4, but the Senate failed to ratify them.9 2 This last
revision to the Warsaw Convention still remains on the
Senate calendar. 3
The responsibilty of converting the Warsaw Conven-
tion's liability limits to the currency of the United States
was delegated under the Federal Aviation Act 94 to the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) .9  Federal regulations re-
quire airlines to file tariffs with the CAB specifying in U.S.
currency the cargo liability limits to which they adhere.96
The CAB must reject tariffs that do not conform to CAB
or FAA regulations97 and the Warsaw Convention.9" The
CAB required airlines to use the official price of gold in
converting the Warsaw Convention liability limits to dol-
lars, and when the official price of gold was abolished in
1978, the CAB continued to use the last official price of
gold.90 The last official price of gold, $42.22 per ounce,
equates to a liability limit of $9.07 per pound of cargo. 0 0
- Montreal Agreement No. 3, supra note 63, ICAO Doc; No. 9147, art. II, E-l;
A. LoWENFELD, supra note 21, at 7-171. See generally, FitzGerald, supra note 61.
91 Montreal Agreement No. 4, supra note 63, ICAO Doc. No. 9148, art. VII, E-3;
A. LOWENFELD, supra note 21, at 7-171. See generally, FitzGerald, supra note 61.
92 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 21, at 7-171, 7-175. See generally, FitzGerald, supra
note 61.
93 Id.
9- Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976).
's Id. During the years at issue in this case, CAB had the responsibility. The
Court in Franklin Mint stated that: "With respect to foreign air transportation FAA
powers are not exercised by the Department of Transportation in consultation
with the Department of State. 49 U.S.C. § 1551 (Supp. V 1981). For simplicity
[the Supreme Court] opinion will continue to refer only to the CAB." 104 S. Ct.
at 1780, n.3.
49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1976).
97 Id.
98 Id. § 1502.
1,9 CAB Order 78-8-10, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,971, 35,972 (1978).
loo Id.
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C. Cases
With the Senate's failure to ratify the Montreal Proto-
cols, the United States courts were faced with the dilemma
of what unit of conversion to use in converting the War-
saw Convention liability limits, which are expressed in
terms of the French franc of a specified gold content, 0 to
United States currency. The courts chose among four ba-
sic standards: (1) the free-market price of gold;1 2 (2) the
last official price of gold (used by the CAB);' 0 3 (3) the
SDRs; 104 and (4) the exchange value of the French franc at
the time of the accident.10 5
In Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Alitalia Airlines, t°6 cargo being
transported to Kinney via Alitalia Airlines disappeared
during shipment. 10 7 The court granted summary judg-
ment to Kinney on the issue of liability and then turned its
attention to the appropriate amount of damages.10 8 With-
out explaining its reasoning, the court used the value of
the current French franc as the factor for converting the
liability limits of Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention into
United States dollars.'0 9
The court in Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc. 110 was faced with deciding the
amount to award for damage to cargo which occurred
during shipment via Pan American from Brazil to Texas.
01 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
102 Boehringer Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways,
531 F. Supp. 344, 353 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
o3 In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp.
833, 842 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
-, Although no U.S. court chose the SDRs as a conversion factor, it was
presented as a possible factor to various courts. See, e.g., id. at 839; Franklin Mint
Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 525 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
105 Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Alitalia Airlines, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,509, 18,513 n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
106 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,509 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
107 Id. at 18,510.
to Id. at 18,512.
1o Id. at 18,513 n.9. "The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the
French franc is valued at approximatly $.24 as reported in the New York Times of
October 2, 1980." Id.
1o 531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
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The two factors the court considered for converting the
liability limits of the Warsaw Convention into United
States dollars were the former official price of gold and
the current free-market price of gold.'' After an exten-
sive historical analysis of the treaty's liability limits and
the developments in the international monetary system,
the court stated that it would not use the former official
price of gold;' 1 2 rather, the court concluded that the only
proper conversion factor since 1978 was the free-market
price of gold." 3
In In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on March 14,
1980, t t 4 claimants brought suit on behalf of decedents
killed in an airplane crash in Warsaw, Poland." 5 The
court had to determine the correct conversion factor to
use for the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention.' 1 6
The plaintiffs argued that the correct conversion factor
was the free-market price of gold. ' 7 The defendants as-
serted that the correct unit of conversion was the ex-
change value of the current French franc or the SDRs. 18
The court also considered the last official price of gold in
the United States, although neither side argued for this
unit of conversion." 9 The court rejected the conversion
factors championed by the plaintiffs and defendants, 20
concluding that the last official price of gold is the correct
". Id. at 349.
112 Id. at 353. The court determined that it should not "employ the fiction of an
official U.S. price of gold in converting the limitation sums expressed in the [War-
saw] Convention." Id.
I1 Id.






2 ' Id. at 842. The court rejected the free-market price of gold because it would
not provide constancy and stability and would therefore "directly contravene the
intentions of all those who adopted the treat[y]." Id. at 842-43. The court re-
jected the current French franc and the SDR because "it would be a mistake to
conclude from the fact that gold no longer plays a role in the international mone-
tary system that all references to gold in the [Warsaw] Convention may be ignored
in calculating the liability limitation and a new measure substituted." Id. at 843.
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unit of conversion.' 2 ' The court stated the merit of using
the last official price of gold is that this price "constitutes
a conversion factor established by precisely the kind of
mechanism that the [treaty's] drafters
contemplated ... 22
The district court in Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World
Airlines'21 was asked to decide the correct unit for con-
verting the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention into
United States dollars. 24 Trans World Airlines argued for
the SDRs, the last official price of gold in the United
States, or the exchange value of the current French
franc. 125 Franklin Mint Corporation introduced a fourth
possiblity: the free market price of gold. 126  The court
concluded that because the last official price of gold was
the conversion factor supported by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, that factor "comes as close as anything to consti-
tuting a governmental interpretation of the Article 22
limitation.' ' 27
Franklin Mint appealed the decision, causing the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals to consider the issue of the
appropriate conversion factor.'28  The court stated that
there was a. powerful argument against each of the sug-
gested conversion factors.' 2 9 Therefore, the court con-
121 Id. at 842.
122 Id. at 843.
123 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
12 Id. at 1289.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. The court further stated that if they "[w]ere ... writing on a clean slate
. . . [they] would find the arguments in favor of the. . . [SDR] most persuasive."
Id.
"28 Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 3085 (1983).
129 Id. at 306.
The last official price of gold is a price which has been explicitly re-
pealed by the Congress . . . . It thus lacks any status in law or rela-
tionship to contemporary currency values. The free market price of
gold is the highly volatile price of a commodity determined in part
by forces of supply and demand unrelated to currency values. SDR's
are a creation of the IMF, modified at will by that body and having
no basis in the convention. The French franc is simply one domestic
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cluded that it is impossible for the courts to enforce the
Warsaw Convention since there is no conversion factor
specified by law and because courts lack the power to se-
lect a new unit of conversion. 3
0
II. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES V. FRANKLIN MINT CORP.
On final appeal, Franklin Mint presented the Supreme
Court with two questions: (1) whether the repeal in 1978
of the Par Value Modification Act'' eliminating an official
price of gold rendered the liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention unenforceable in the United States; 3 2 and (2)
if not, what is the correct unit of conversion for con-
verting the gold-based liability limit of the Warsaw Con-
vention into United States currency? 133  The Court
unanimously agreed that the liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention were not rendered unenforceable by repeal-
ing the Par Value Modification Act.' 34 The Court differed
as to the correct conversion unit; the majority chose the
last official price of gold, in accordance with the CAB reg-
ulations, 13 5 and the dissent' 36 advocated the free market
price of gold. 137
The Supreme Court gave three reasons for rejecting
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that repealing the Par
Value Modification Act rendered the liability limits of the
Warsaw Convention unenforceable. 138 First, the Court
followed a canon of construction which provides that "[a]
currency, subject to change by the unilateral act of a single
government.
Id.
,30Id. at 306, 311. One United States District Court followed the lead of the
Second Circuit. In re Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport, Korea on Novem-
ber 18, 1980, 558 F. Supp. 72 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
1.1 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
13v 104 S. Ct. at 1782. The Court stated that this was the most important issue
raised in Franklin Mint.
I3 d. at 1778-79.
134 Id. at 1778.
5 Id. at 1779.
136 Justice Stevens wrote the sole dissenting opinion.
137 104 S.Ct. at 1794-95.
8 Id. at 1783.
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treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or mod-
ified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of
the Congress has been clearly expressed."' 139  The Court
noted that because repeal of the Par Value Modification
Act "was unrelated to the [Warsaw] Convention," 140 Con-
gress' silence as to the Warsaw Convention in repealing
the Act could certainly not be taken as a clear expression
of their intent to abrogate the treaty. 14 1  Second, the
Court reasoned that because the Warsaw Convention was
a "self-executing treaty"'' 42 it needed no legislation to
give it the force of law in the United States; consequently,
repealing an unrelated domestic Act could not abrogate
the treaty. 43 Finally, if abrogation of the treaty was in-
tended, Congress or the Executive Branch was obligated
under article 39 of the treaty to formally notify other sig-
natories six months prior to withdrawal. 44 No notice was
given and the Court noted that the Executive Branch
maintained that the liability limits of the treaty should be
enforceable in the United States. 45
Franklin Mint argued that under the doctrine of rebus sic
,39 Id. (quoting Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933)).




,44 Id. See generally, Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 39. The text of article
39, is found, supra, at note 46.
145 104 S. Ct. at 1783. The Executive Branch stated in its Amicus Curiae brief:
"[The Court of Appeal's] decision threatens to undermine a significant interna-
tional law regime to which the United States is committed and to subject this
country to adverse repercussions in the international community." Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae]. Further, the Executive Branch asserted that if the court of ap-
peals' opinion is allowed to stand,
[it] will have significant adverse consequences for the United States
both in its immediate application to the Warsaw Convention and in
its broader implications for the treaty obligations of this country
generally. The United States continues to regard the Warsaw Con-
vention as a binding international agreement . . . . The United
States remains committed to the Convention as the basic instrument
governing questions of liability in the international aviation industry.
Id. at 7.
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stantibus,t46 the Warsaw Convention was not enforceable
because circumstances changed significantly since the
promulgation of the treaty. 14 7 The Court countered this
argument by explaining that while a nation might conceiv-
ably use changed circumstances for terminating its partici-
pation in a treaty, "a private person who finds the continued
existence of the treaty inconvenient may not invoke the
doctrine [of rebus sic stantibus] on their behalf." 1 48
Having concluded that the treaty limits were enforcea-
ble, the Court was presented with various alternatives as
factors for converting the liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention into United States currency. TWA argued in
favor of either the last official price of gold or the SDR's
created by the IMF.1 49 Franklin Mint argued for the use of
the free-market price of gold.1 50 The Court chose the last
official price of gold specified in the CAB's regulations
concerning liability limits.15 ' The majority noted that the
need for a conversion factor is derived from section
1373(a) of the Federal Aviation Act 152 rather than from
,46 "A name given to a tacit condition, said to attach to all treaties, that they
shall cease to be obligatory as soon as the state of facts and conditions upon which
they were founded has substantially changed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1139
(5th ed. 1979).
147 Brief of Franklin Mint Corp. at 40, Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Franklin Mint].
148 104 S. Ct. at 1783 (emphasis added). Since the Warsaw Convention allows
nations to withdraw after giving notice, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus lacks prac-
tical application except to avoid the required notice. Id. at 1783 n.24.
149 Brief of Trans World Airlines at 15, 30, Trans World Airlines v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1776 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief of TWA]. TWA also
argued in favor of the use of the current French franc in the lower courts but did
not present this argument to the Supreme Court. Brief of Franklin Mint, supra
note 147, at 27 & n.21.
10 Brief of Franklin Mint, supra note 147, at 17 - 37.
151 104 S. Ct. at 1784-87.
15 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1982) states as follows:
Every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file with the
Board . . .tariffs showing all rates, fares, and charges for air trans-
portation . . . .and showing to the extent required by regulations
of the Board, all classifications, rules, regulations, practices, and
services in connection with such air transportation . ..The rates,
fares, and charges shown in any tariff shall be stated in terms of law-
ful money of the United States ....
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the Warsaw Convention.- 3 CAB Order 74-1-16 requires
using the last official price of gold as a conversion factor,
which results in a $9.07 per pound liability limit. 54
Therefore, the Court viewed using the official price of
gold as an "Executive-Branch determination, made pursu-
ant to properly delegated authority ... .5 With this
view, the Court decided to uphold this "Executive-Branch
determination" unless it was contrary to domestic legisla-
tion or the Warsaw Convention.' 5 6 Concluding that the
CAB limit does not violate domestic laws, 57 the Court
turned to the more difficult issue of whether it violated
the treaty.
The Court analyzed the reasons why delegates to the
treaty expressed the liability limits in terms of gold. 58
The Court found that the delegates' first purpose was to
establish a limit on the airline's liability. 59 The majority
conceded that any conversion factor, including the free-
market price of gold, would have this effect. 160 The sec-
ond purpose was "to set a stable, predictable, and inter-
,53 104 S. Ct. at 1784.
154 Id. at 1784 & n.25. CAB Order 74-1-16 was promulgated in 1974 and has
been "actively reviewed" since 1978. CAB restated its position in support of the
last official price of gold in CAB Order 78-8-10, promulgated in 1978. CAB Or-
der 74-1-16 was in force during the dates at issue in this case. Id. at 1782.
' Id. at 1784. The dissent stressed that all powers delegated to the CAB must
be exercised consistently with the Warsaw Convention. According to the dissent,
CAB's opinion should not receive special deference in determining the meaning
of the treaty: "[T]he CAB is not the governmental organ charged with enforcing
the liability limitation - that responsibility rests with the courts of the United
States." Id. at 1795 n.5. Instead, the dissent contended that the courts must ap-
ply the conversion factor specified in the treaty. Id. The dissent also disagreed
with the Court on whether Congress delegated its authority over the currency to
the CAB. The Court claimed that Congress did delegate its authority for the nar-
row issue of determining a conversion factor. Id. at 1784 n.26. The dissent
claimed that Congress did not. Id. at 1796 n.6.
156 Id. at 1784.
1, Id. The Court reasoned that the CAB used the official price of gold when
that price was specified by statute. When Congress repealed the Par Value Modi-
fication Act, however, it did not intend for the CAB to change the conversion
factor. Id.
- Id. at 1785.
9 Id.
- Id. "[I]n this regard a $9.07 per pound liabilty limit is as reasonable as one
based on SDRs or the free market price of gold." Id.
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nationally uniform limit that would encourage the growth
of a fledgling industry."'' 61 The Court concluded that
"CAB's choice"' 162 of a $9.07 per pound liability limit sat-
isfied this objective, especially if revised periodically to
meet the need for international uniformity. 63 The Court
noted that the $9.07 per pound limit has been reasonably
stable since 1978 in terms of conversion into other west-
ern currencies.' 64 This standard has remained consistent
with the value of the SDR during this same period of
time.165 The Court concluded that use of the free-market
price of gold would fail to establish a stable unit of con-
version because gold has become a commodity166 which is
subject to unpredictable swings in price. 67
The Court speculated that the third objective of con-
necting the liability limits to gold may have been to estab-
lish a constant value that would keep pace with the value
of goods shipped.' 68 While acknowledging that "a fixed,
dollar-based liability limit" may not achieve this purpose,
the Court concluded that the signatory nations never evi-
denced this purpose by their conduct since they allowed
the value of the liability limits to decline from the begin-
ning. 169  It reasoned that just as the conduct of con-
161 Id. "[Tihe [Warsaw] Convention's framers chose an international, not a pa-
rochial, standard, free from the control of any one country." Id. (footnote omit-
ted). The dissent, however, implicity accused the Court of choosing a parochial
standard. Id. at 1795 n.6.
162 Id. at 1795. Throughout the opinion the majority is careful to phrase the
use of the last official price of gold as "CAB's choice." The dissent viewed this
deliberate phrasing as implying that the majority might not have made the same
choice. Id. at 1795 n.5.
165 Id. at 1785.
164 Id.
65 Id. The dissent found it incredible that the Court was comforted by the fact
that the $9.07 per pound limit is as stable as a limit based on SDRs, despite the
fact that the Montreal Protocols, which used a limit based on SDRs, were rejected
by the Senate. The dissent concluded that "the CAB [is accepting] tariffs based
on the [rejected] Montreal Protocols .. " Id. at 1798 n. 10.
- The dissent claimed that gold's "nominal value is still overwhelmingly its
value in exchange, not its value in use - it is not simply another commodity. Fort
Knox does not house any pork bellies." Id. at 1797 n. 9.
167 Id. at 1786.
1 " Id.
69 Id. "For a hypothetical 44-pound lost suitcase the liability limit was $330 in
177
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tracting parties must be considered when construing a
contract, the conduct of the treaty signatories must be
considered when construing a treaty.170 Furthermore, the
Court stated that use of the free-market price of gold
would also not serve to establish a stable value of airline
liability.' 7 ' "A liability limit tied to the gold market might
be convenient for a dispatcher of gold bullion, but such a
limit would simply force other air transport users and car-
riers to become unwilling speculators in the gold mar-
ket. . . . The Convention was intended to reduce, not to
increase, the economic uncertainties of air
transportation." 72
After reviewing the reason why the delegates to the
Warsaw Convention linked the liability limits to gold, the
Court concluded that the $9.07 per pound liability limit is
"sufficiently consistent" with these purposes. 73 Further-
more, "tying the Convention's liability limit to today's
gold market would fail to effect any purpose of the Con-
vention's framers, and would be inconsistent with well-es-
tablished international practice, acquiesced in by the
Convention's signatories over the past 50 years. ' ' t74
1934, $359 in 1972, and $400 in 1974. In terms of purchasing power, 330 dollars
in 1934 was equivalent to $1031 in 1972 and $1215 in 1974. . . . Clearly, the
$9.07 per pound liability limit does not represent the same value that was in effect
when the United States adhered to the [Warsaw] Convention." Id. at 1786 n. 34.
171 Id. at 1787.
171 Id.
12 Id. The dissent countered that this statement is "mere rhetoric" because the
airlines strongly lobbied in favor of liability limits. Furthermore, the dissent
stated that if the airlines do not like speculating in the gold market they can try to
modify the treaty. The dissent noted that the airlines have tried to modify the
treaty through the Montreal Protocols (which would substitute limits based on
SDRs rather than gold), but have failed to obtain Senate ratification. The dissent
concluded that through the majority's decision the airline's attorneys have won
the battle their lobbyists had lost. Id. at 1798 n.9.
173 Id. at 1785. The dissent claimed that the deficiency with this conclusion is
that the delegates to the treaty adopted a gold-based limitation. Id. at 1795 n.6.
The dissent stated that this free-market price of gold is the only conversion factor
which reflects this gold-based limitation. Id. at 1794-95.
,74 Id. at 1785. In the dissent's opinion only, the purpose of stability and pre-
dictability is not served by the gold standard. This does not present a serious
problem for the dissent since it would be easy to determine the exact liability limit
on the date of shipment. Although insurance rates would have to reflect the vari-
[50
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Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, agreed with the
Court that the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention
are enforceable in the United States. 75 However, Justice
Stevens favored the free-market price of gold as a conver-
sion factor. 1 76 He stated that his approach to determining
the appropriate conversion factor differed from the
Court's approach because he believed that the Court first
should determine and then should apply the liability lim-
its specified in the convention.17 7 He stressed that the
plain language of the treaty ties the liability limits to gold,
not a fixed-dollar amount. 178 Justice Stevens claimed that
the majority reformed the Warsaw Convention "to corre-
spond more closely to the Convention's 'purposes' than
the limitation actually selected by the Convention it-
self."' 179 The express language of the treaty, the debate of
the delegates, and the contemporary law of nations made
it clear to Justice Stevens that the gold clause was in-
tended to insure that payment would be "in dollars of a
value as constant as that of gold,"' 80 and that therefore,
ances in the gold market, this is hardly a task incapable of accomplishment. Id. at
1797-98 & n.9.
175 Id. at 1788-98.
176 Id. at 1794-95.
177 Id. at 1795.
178 Id. at 1788, 1790-91.
179 id. at 1788.
18o Id. at 1792. (citing Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 302
(1935)). The dissent states that the delegates to the Warsaw Convention had de-
liberately avoided having liability limits expressed in terms of a national currency.
Id. at 1790; see supra note 25 and accompanying text. Gold clauses were common
in treaties, therefore the dissent looked to the interpretation given to these
clauses in other treaties. The dissent quoted the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice in Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, Hudson II
W.C. 340 (1929), Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France,
Hudson II W.C. 402 (1929), (Serbian and Brazilian Bond Cases) (July 12, 1929) as
follows:
[Ilt is not admissible to assert that the standard should not govern
the payment because the depreciation in French currency was not
foreseen, or, as it is insisted, could not be foreseen at the time the
contracts were made. The question is not what the Parties actually foresaw,
or could foresee, but what means they selected for their protection. To safe-
guard the repayment of the loans, they provided for payment in gold
value having reference to a recognized standard [of weight and
fineness]. ...
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the free-market price of gold should be the conversion
factor. ' 8"
The dissent stressed that delegates to the Warsaw Con-
vention specifically chose an international, rather than a
parochial, standard. 82 Justice Stevens argued that the
court has returned to a parochial standard by choosing a
conversion factor based on a national currency. 8 3 He
viewed this factor as being wholly within the control of the
United States and therefore contrary to the manifest in-
tent of the delegates to the treaty.'84 The dissent ac-
knowledged that the gold clause may be a relic, but
contended that it was required by the Warsaw Conven-
tion. 8 5 Hence, Justice Stevens stated the Court is obliged
to apply this conversion factorjust as it is obliged to apply
the liability limits. 8 6 Justice Stevens noted that when
there was an official price of gold, conversion to United
States dollars.was determined by law.' 87 Although the in-
ternational monetary system may no longer be based on
gold, the dissent claimed that the Warsaw Convention's
standard of value is still based on gold. 88 Justice Stevens
stated that "[t]he price of gold is simply no longer fixed
104 S. Ct. at 1791 (emphasis by dissent).
181 Id. at 1792.
182 Id. at 1790-91. The dissent stressed that the delegates to the Warsaw Con-
vention rejected a standard based on a national currency, preferring instead to tie
the limits to a specific quantity and fineness of gold. Id.
18 Id. at 1795 n.6.
I d. at 1790 "[T]he delegates had selected as the standard of value a com-
modity with a value independent of any one nation's control; indeed, a commodity
perceived to have 'intrinsic' value - a commodity individuals had valued before
there were nations, and would value whether or not national governments made it
an official medium of exchange." Id. at 1790 n.2.
The Court agreed that the delegates chose an international standard; there is,
however, no discussion in the Court's opinion of the necessity of the standard
being outside the control of any one nation. In fact, the Court concluded that the
treaty's goal of establishing an internationally uniform limit would necessitate pe-
riodic adjustments of the conversion factor by the CAB. Id. at 1785. The Court
clearly anticipated further control by the U.S. government.
85 Id. at 1793-94.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 1794.
188 Id. "Gold has now been demonitized. But the [Warsaw] Convention's stan-
dard of value remains and the concept of value has not changed." Id.
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by law. Gold, however, still will exchange for dollars.
The rate at which a domestic currency exchanges for gold
was and is the only 'conversion' permitted or anticipated
by the Convention. That figure is the liability limitation of
the Warsaw Convention." 1
89
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSION
Both the Court and Justice Stevens claim their choice of
a conversion factor is supported by the Warsaw Conven-
tion delegates' purpose in establishing liability limits.
The opinions cite the following purposes for establishing
liability limits expressed in terms of gold: (1) setting some
limit on a carrier's liability for lost cargo; (2) setting a sta-
ble and predictable limit; (3) setting a constant value that
would keep pace with the value of cargo; and (4) setting
an internationally uniform limit.1 90 Both the Court and
the dissent acknowledged that any conversion factor
would achieve the first purpose,' 9 and both also acknowl-
edged that the second purpose is best achieved by the
Court's choice of the last official price of gold. 92 The
Court conceded that its choice of a fixed, dollar-based fac-
tor may fail to achieve the third purpose, 93 but this au-
thor does not see that the free-market price of gold will
better approximate the value of cargo.
The dissent argued that the Court's choice of the fixed,
dollar-based liability limit does not meet the fourth pur-
pose, establishing an internationally uniform limit. 194 The
dissent noted that the delegates to the Warsaw Conven-
tion specifically avoided tying the liability limits to any
one national currency, opting instead for an international
value such as the price of gold. 195 As the majority notes,
however, the liability limit in the United States was always
'89 Id. at 1794-95.
1- Id. at 1785-86, 1797 n.9.
19 Id. at 1785, 1797 n.9.
192 Id.
1'9 Id. at 1786.
- Id. at 1797 n.9.
195 Id. at 1791. See specifically the Swiss delegate's statement quoted supra at
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based on a fixed-dollar amount because Congress set the
conversion rate between gold and the dollar.1 96 This con-
version rate bore no relation to the free-market price of
gold. The only difference resulting from the Court's
choice of the $9.07 per pound limit is that now the con-
version rate is established by the CAB rather than Con-
gress. In this author's opinion, the dissent has failed to
reconcile the discrepancy of accepting the fixed-dollar
based liability limit when Congress set the rate at which
the dollar converted into gold and yet rejecting this same
liability limit when the CAB set the conversion rate.
The Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin
Mint Corp. has allocated the risk of insuring cargo loss to
the shippers. This allocation of risk will undoubtedly ap-
ply to both the sophisticated shipper as well as to the
tourist with a piece of crystal in his luggage. If the cargo
is worth more than $9.07 per pound, it should be insured
by the shipper.
This opinion does not address the liability limits for
personal injury. In this author's opinion, this case cannot
be read as allocating to the passenger the risk of insuring
against personal injury. The American courts will con-
tinue to find ways to avoid applying the treaty's liability
limits to personal injury claims.
Throughout the Supreme Court's opinion there are un-
dertones of distaste for the liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention. The Court used subtlely disapproving lan-
guage,19 7 while the dissent flatly states that the treaty's lia-
bility limits are "anachronistic in today's world of
aviation." 19' The dissent agreed with the Court that the
political branches of government have the exclusive
note 25. The majority concludes that this purpose can be satisfied by periodic
adjustments to the $9.07 per pound limit by the CAB. Id. at 1785.
19 Id. at 1784 n.26.
1'9 Id. at 1786-87. The Court stated that the treaty was intended to last only a
few years, not one or two centuries. Id. at 1786. The Court further stated that
they are enforcing the liability limits because the political branches of the govern-
ment have not chosen to repudiate these limits. Id. at 1787.
1- Id. at 1793.
[50
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power to repudiate the Warsaw Convention.' 99 Clearly,
the Supreme Court is calling on the political branches to
either adopt the latest amendment to the Warsaw Con-
vention or to repudiate the treaty. Definitive action by the
political branches of the United States government con-
cerning the Warsaw Convention is certainly needed.
Dawn Davenport
,- Id. at 1787, 1793-94.
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